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THE "NEW BODY SNATCHERS":*
ANALYZING THE EFFECT OF PRESUMED
CONSENT ORGAN DONATION LAWS ON
PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, AND LIBERTY
Maryellen Liddy**
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its
incidents. A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on
earth. A man who but yesterday breathed, and thought, and
walked among us has passed away. Something has gone. The
body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of
the man we knew. Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it
may reach hope. It must be laid away. And the law-that rule
of action which touches all human things-must touch also this
thing of death.1
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of July 22, 1999, Fort Worth, Texas police found
an unconscious, unidentified man lying in a field in the far south-
eastern corner of the city.2 Upon examination at John Peter Smith
Hospital, doctors discovered that "John Doe" was suffering from
bleeding and swelling on the brain, though his body showed no
signs of trauma.3 He also tested positive for cocaine use. 4 Al-
though doctors declared John Doe brain dead at 5:30 p.m. that eve-
ning, they maintained him on a ventilator for an additional thirty-
two hours while the LifeGift Organ Donation Center sought a
* Melanie Phillips, Tyranny of the New Body Snatchers, SUN. TIMES (London),
July 11, 1999, at 17.
** J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., Sociology,
magna cum laude, New York University, 1996. I would like to thank my parents, Je-
rome and Annette Liddy, for their continuous support and understanding throughout
my many years of higher education. Special thanks to Professor Charles Kelbley for
his assistance in the preparation of this Note, as well as for awakening my interest in
constitutional law. Finally, this Note is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather,
Michael Gramegna, who came to the United States many years ago in search of a
better life-in every way that matters, I am here because of him.
1. Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1553 (D. Kan. 1995) (quoting
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24 (Ga. 1905)).
2. Charlotte Huff, Organs of Brain-Dead Patient Granted, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, July 24, 1999, at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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court order authorizing the coroner to release all organs from the
man's body.' In its petition, LifeGift cited a Texas law allowing
organs to be harvested from unidentified persons under the coro-
ner's jurisdiction, provided a four-hour search is conducted for the
next of kin.6 Late in the evening of July 23, 1999, Texas District
Judge Bob McGrath granted LifeGift's request, and the following
morning a team of surgeons removed John Doe's heart, liver, pan-
creas, intestines, kidneys, and remaining lung.7
Four days after the organ removal, a technician at a neighboring
police department, acting upon a request from the Tarrant County
Medical Examiner's office, conducted a second fingerprint check
and discovered that John Doe was actually Arthur Forge Jr. of Fort
Worth.8 Subsequent investigation revealed that Forge's nephew
had filed a missing persons report with the Fort Worth Police De-
partment on Monday, July 20, two days before Forge's body was
found and a full four days before the organ harvesting.9 At the
time, Fort Worth Police officials could not explain why their finger-
print analysis was unsuccessful, nor could they offer any reason for
their failure to check the missing persons list.10 While officials
maintained that their search was reasonable and the organ harvest-
ing proper, one commentator, reflecting on the incident, noted that
Texas' presumed consent organ donation law might "scare people
[into believing] that the state could be body snatchers. I don't
think anybody had that in mind."'"
As medical technology advances, doctors are increasingly able to
replace failing organs with fully functioning, donated organs.'x
5. Charlotte Huff, With Time Critical, Rights of John Doe Kin Cloud Transplant
Issue, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 31, 1999, at 1.
6. Id.
7. Organs for Transplant Harvested from Clinically Dead 'John Doe,' HOUSTON
CHRON., July 25, 1999, at 41. According to Ron Ehrle, Managing Director of
LifeGift's North Texas office, "[O]ne of the lungs had deteriorated to the point that it
couldn't be used for transplant." Huff, supra note 5.
8. Charlotte Huff, Fingerprint Tests Identify Organ Donor, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, July 29, 1999, at 1.
9. Id.
10. See Court-Ordered Organ Donor Belatedly Identified, AUSTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, July 30, 1999, at B9.
11. Huff, supra note 5; see also Phillips, supra note 1 (criticizing a proposed con-
sent system in England as body snatching).
12. E.g., Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Pro-
posed Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1022
(1999) (citation omitted); Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft
and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 682 (1988). But cf
Fiona Barton, Donor Crisis 'is Causing Thousands of Deaths,' MAIL ON SUN. (Eng.),
July 25, 1999, at 45 (quoting the Medical Director of a Cambridge transplant service
816
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However, because organ transplantation has become successful in
a wide variety of cases, there are simply not enough organs availa-
ble to meet the high level of need.13 To understand the extent of
the shortage, it may be helpful to first examine the current statistics
regarding organ donation in the United States. An estimated
70,000 Americans are currently awaiting life saving organ trans-
plants.' 4 While approximately 21,000 people "receive the gift of
life" through transplantation each year, nearly 5000 people-or
thirteen each day-will die waiting for an organ to become availa-
ble. 5 Moreover, although 15,000 potential donors die annually
under circumstances making organ donation possible, consent to
donation is only received in about 6000 of these cases.'
6
The numbers clearly illustrate the nature of the problem. Inter-
estingly, though the American public is quite aware of the need for
donated organs,'7 this awareness has not yet translated into in-
creased donations, and most Americans are still not signing organ
as saying, "We are in the same sort of business as mechanics. Instead of tinkering
with a [carburetor] that is not working, you stick a new one in. But you can't do that
for everyone").
13. E.g., Laurie G. Futterman, Presumed Consent: The Solution to the Critical Do-
nor Shortage?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 161, 168 (Arthur L. Caplan
& Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) (noting that, in spite of medical advances, unceasing
demand has depleted the organ supply in the United States). "[Blecause of [trans-
plantation] technology, even more people have been added to the national waiting
list." 146 Cong. Rec. H333-07, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Rep. Karen L.
Thurman).
14. H.R. Con. Res. 247 (2000) (establishing National Donor Day on February 12,
2000); S. Res. 225 (1999) (designating November 23, 2000 as a day to "Give Thanks,
Give Life").
15. S. Res. 225.
16. Id.
17. TWo recent examples should illustrate how organ transplantation has become a
common news topic. In a much-publicized 1999 case, Walter Payton, popular former
professional football player with the Chicago Bears, died from a rare liver disease.
Although a liver transplant could have saved Payton's life, his disease had progressed
too quickly, making a transplant impossible. 145 Cong. Rec. S14927-02, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) (emphasizing that "[t]he prevention of
deaths like that of this great man and of so many other silent heroes is why our efforts
in this life-saving cause must continue"). Moreover, on March 15, 2000, Sean Elliott,
of the National Basketball Association San Antonio Spurs, was the subject of numer-
ous national news stories as he became the first professional athlete in any sport to
return to active participation after a kidney transplant. E.g., Elliott's Return Inspires
Spurs, THE STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Mar. 15, 2000, at 41; cf. Phyllis Coleman, Brother
Can You Spare a Liver? Five Ways to Increase Organ Donation, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1
(1996) (discussing the public controversy over the remarkably short periods of time
that former New York Yankee Mickey Mantle, musician David Crosby, actor Larry
Hagman, and Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey each had to wait before receiving
organ transplants).
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donation pledge cards. 18 Therefore, politicians and medical profes-
sionals are debating alternative solutions for the critical organ
shortage, including presumed consent organ donation laws.
Part I of this Note will discuss presumed consent and explain the
salient features of presumed consent laws. Part I also will examine
organ donation in the United States from a legal standpoint, ana-
lyzing anatomical gift statutes in this country and illustrating the
ways in which our current system already encompasses presumed
consent. This Part will conclude by discussing case law that ad-
dresses the aftermath of unauthorized organ or tissue harvesting.
Part II of this Note will examine the United States Supreme
Court's evolving conceptions of the rights of individual and family-
based privacy, autonomy, and liberty, for subsequent application to
the presumed consent organ donation controversy. In addition,
Part II will discuss legal scholars' efforts to interpret these some-
times conflicting Supreme Court decisions, as a means of clarifying
the rights involved in the presumed consent organ donation de-
bate. Finally, in Part III, this Note will analyze presumed consent
laws in light of the donors and their families' privacy, autonomy,
and liberty interests. Using this framework, this Note will conclude
that current presumed consent organ donation laws in the United
States are both unethical and unconstitutional.
I. PRESUMED CONSENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF ORGAN DONATION
A. Presumed Consent Models
In a presumed consent system, doctors assume that every person
wishes to become an organ donor upon death.'9 Specifically, un-
less a person has rebutted the presumption of consent by affirma-
tively "opting out" of the system, the greater community may claim
18. Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice for Organ Donation: Time to Give it a Try, in
THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 147, 147-48 (stating that
"relatively few people take advantage of this law and record their wishes about pos-
thumous organ donation"); UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gw-r ACT, Prefatory Note, 8A
U.L.A. 20 (1993) (citing a 1985 Gallup Poll in which seventy-five percent of Ameri-
cans approved of organ donation, while only seventeen percent had actually com-
pleted organ donor cards).
19. E.g., Linda Beecham, BMA Wants Presumed Consent for Organ Donors, BRIT.
MED. J., July 17, 1999, at 141; Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has
Come to Refocus the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 181 (1997).
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the right to remove much-needed organs.2° Presumed consent laws
are based upon the belief that while most people wish to donate
their organs, they are simply reluctant to address the seemingly re-
mote issues of death and organ transplantation while still healthy.2'
Thus, presumed consent allows the state to act upon a silent con-
sensus and remove organs without explicit permission.2 2 Moreo-
ver, because everyone is considered a potential donor, subject to
opt-out, supporters believe that presumed consent laws will result
in an increased supply of organs for transplant and an end to donee
waiting lists. 23
A properly functioning presumed consent system must, of
course, be based upon popular support. However, this protection
alone is not sufficient. For example, because individuals must af-
firmatively express their refusal to donate organs while still legally
competent, presumed consent systems require a well-educated and
motivated public.24 Otherwise, the underlying support for the sys-
tem is eroded, resulting in society's recovery of organs based upon
people's "lethargy" and "ignorance," rather than their unexpressed
20. Mark D. Fox, Directed Organ Donation: Donor Autonomy and Community
Values, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION 43, 45 (Bethany Spielman ed., 1996); Cole-
man, supra note 17, at 18.
21. Arthur L. Caplan, Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver
Organs for Transplantation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13,
at 142, 144 (noting that while surveys show the public supports organ donation, many
people find the topic "upsetting and distasteful"); Futterman, supra note 13, at 163
(stating that "[n]atural hesitation to confront one's mortality is a major reason that
only 15 percent of the public sign and carry an organ donor card, request notation on
their driver's license, or make some provision in a living will"); MacDonald, supra
note 19, at 180 (commenting that most potential organ donors are "reluctant to con-
template and plan for their own deaths").
22. Some commentators argue that removing organs without permission amounts
to a system of "routine salvage." R.M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed
Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies, in THE ETHICS OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 173 (explaining that laws authorizing organ
removal without permission are not based on presumed consent); Silver, supra note
12, at 706 (arguing that "presumed consent represents conscription in disguise");
Robinson, supra note 12, at 1031 (equating presumed consent with routine salvage).
However, as these laws are more commonly referred to with the "presumed consent"
label, this Note will adhere to that convention.
23. MacDonald, supra note 19, at 181; Coleman, supra note 17, at 18 (stating that
"[a]lthough the evidence is not overwhelming, presumed consent seems to increase
organ supply").
24. Lisa Melton, Inroads Made Into Transplantation Problems, 354 LANCET 1272
(1999) (noting that presumed consent schemes need "strong public education" to "en-
sure consent is truly given"); see Silver, supra note 12, at 706 (arguing that most peo-
ple are not inclined to actively assert their rights).
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true desires. A presumed consent system must also contain an
effective mechanism for recording and reviewing opt-outs, such as
a centralized data bank or registry.26 Finally, hospitals must be
willing to face the legal ramifications and negative publicity that
may accompany presumed consent organ harvesting. If doctors
and administrators routinely fail to act upon presumed consent,
any benefits of the system will likely be lost.
Presumed consent systems have varying degrees of support in
other nations. Countries with presumed consent laws include Aus-
tria, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.28
In particular, Belgium has utilized a presumed consent model for
more than ten years.29 In the Belgian system, people may exercise
their right to opt out by filing an objection at any local town hall.3 °
These individual donation decisions are then registered in a cen-
tralized database and made accessible only to transplant officials.31
However, despite the existence of the registry, doctors are still en-
couraged to discuss organ and tissue removal with the decedent's
relatives.32 Moreover, physicians are not compelled to harvest any
organs under the presumed consent scheme if they are uncomforta-
ble doing SO. 3 3 Overall, presumed consent is credited with increas-
ing organ donation in Belgium by fifty-five percent within a five-
year period, even though traffic fatalities (a major source of organ
donations) decreased over that same time.34 Presumed consent
supporters point out that only two percent of the Belgian people
25. Clifton Perry, The Right Not to Donate Transplantable Organs, in ORGAN AND
TISSUE DONATION, supra note 20, at 123, 126.
26. See Futterman, supra note 13, at 167 (discussing Belgium's technology as a
model for achieving a centralized data bank under a presumed consent system in the
United States).
27. Commentators point to fear of litigation as a major obstacle in acting upon
donor's wishes under our current system. Caplan, supra note 21, at 145 (stating that
"many hospitals fear adverse legal and financial consequences from their involvement
with organ procurement"); Robert E. Sullivan, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in
ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION, supra note 20, at 19, 31-33 (discussing "unfounded"
fear of liability as a factor in ignoring signed documents of gift).
28. Robinson, supra note 12, at 1031 n.85; MacDonald, supra note 19, at 181.
29. See Beecham, supra note 19.
30. I. Kennedy et al., The Case for 'Presumed Consent' in Organ Donation, 351
LANCET 1650 (1998).
31. Futterman, supra note 13, at 167.
32. Kennedy et al., supra note 30.
33. Futterman, supra note 13, at 167; Kennedy et al., supra note 30.
34. Kennedy et al., supra note 30.
820
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have opted out of the system,35 implying that near-unanimous sup-
port for presumed consent exists within that country.
Other countries have not had similar success with their pre-
sumed consent laws. For instance, the Brazilian government imple-
mented a presumed consent system in February 1997, only to
abolish it one year later, citing widespread public fear and criti-
cism. 36 In the United Kingdom, heated public debate followed the
British Medical Association's ("BMA") 1999 resolution to change
its longstanding policy of rejecting presumed consent.37 Critics la-
beled the BMA's proposed opt-out system "body snatching" and
warned that it would violate human rights standards and demean
people's dignity.38 Because of the lack of public support, the gov-
ernment eventually rejected the proposal.39
B. Organ DTansplantation in the United States
1. Statutes That Embody Presumed Consent
a. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1968)
Organ and tissue transplantation is a relatively recent phenome-
non. Until the early 1960s, surgeons regularly failed in their efforts
to transplant human organs.40 However, with the development of
immunosuppressive therapies, physicians finally were able to con-
trol organ rejection, and successful transplantation became a real-
ity.41 As the frequency of organ transplants increased, the need
arose for legislation to regulate the burgeoning technology. In
1965, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (the "Conference") began to draft a uniform law addressing
35. Id.; Sarah Boseley, Taking it with You: It is Fatuous to Offer Sentimental Re-
spect to Corpses When Their Organs Could Be Used to Save Lives, THE GUARDIAN
(London), July 9, 1999, at 9.
36. Claudio Csillag, Brazil Abolishes 'Presumed Consent' in Organ Donation, 352
LANCET 1367 (1998) (noting that "popular imagination" helped defeat the law, as
people feared that organs would be removed before clinical death occurred).
37. E.g., Beecham, supra note 19, at 141; Dr. Jackie Cassell, Health and Wellbeing:
Options for Organ Donors, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 16, 1999, at 20.
38. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that presumed consent creates a
tyrannical system in which "humanity itself... become[s] no more than the sum of its
body parts"). One commentator suggested that presumed consent would inevitably
fail in England, because of the country's ethnic diversity. Cassell, supra note 37, at 20
(stating that presumed consent would have a "disastrous" effect on "ethnic minorities,
such as first generation Bangladeshis, [who] might lack the literacy and knowledge to
opt out effectively").
39. Charles Erin & John Harris, Presumed Consent or Contracting Out, 25 J. MED.
ETHICS 365 (1999).
40. Silver, supra note 12, at 682.
41. Id.
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organ transplantation in the United States. 42 The Conference re-
viewed data and then-existing laws, issued findings, and ultimately
promulgated a uniform law to be enacted by state legislatures.43
According to the Prefatory Note included in the original 1968
statute, the Conference sought to reconcile the following compet-
ing interests: (1) the decedent's wishes during his lifetime; (2) the
desires of his surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the state's interest
in conducting an autopsy to determine the cause of a death result-
ing from crime or violence; (4) the need for such an autopsy when
private legal rights rest upon the cause of death; and (5) society's
need for organs and tissue for education, research, therapy, and
transplantation.4 4 The Conference attempted to balance these in-
terests by creating the concept of a voluntary anatomical gift.
45
Thus, if a competent donor executed a document of gift before two
witnesses, the organs could be removed for transplantation upon
the donor's death. 6
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the "1968 Act") also created
a priority scheme under which other persons would be allowed to
donate the decedent's organs.47 The descending hierarchy, which
corresponds to the interests discussed above, is as follows:
Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when
persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death,
and in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the
decedent or actual notice of opposition by a member of the
same or a prior class, may give all or any part of the decedent's
body for any purpose specified ...
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his
death,
(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to dis-
pose of the body.48
42. Id. at 693.
43. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 19-21.
44. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIwr AcT, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 64 (1993). One
critic has noted that organ shortages are inevitable when society's need for organs and
tissues is given the lowest priority. Silver, supra note 12, at 694 n.60.
45. Sullivan, supra note 27, at 22.
46. 8A U.L.A. 109, § 4(b).
47. Id. § 2.
48. Id. § 2(b). "Taking into account the very limited time available following
death for the successful removal of such critical tissues as the kidney, the liver and the
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Interestingly, although the 1968 Act is consistently described as
creating a system of "encouraged voluntarism,"4 9 medical examin-
ers, as "person[s] authorized or under obligation to dispose of the
body," are permitted to release a decedent's organs when next of
kin are not available to object.5" This residual authorization thus
creates a "weak" version of presumed consent, as the provision
seemingly allows a coroner to both assume and act upon the dece-
dent's unexpressed desire to donate organs. Again, in certain situ-
ations, the priority scheme does not require the coroner to receive
explicit permission from either the donor (through records) or any
of his or her relatives before harvesting organs. The residual au-
thorization, as embodied by the 1968 Act, is currently the law in
the majority of states, including Alabama,5 Colorado,5 2 Ken-
tucky, 3 Maine,54 Michigan,55 New Jersey,56 New York, 7 and North
Carolina. 8
b. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987)
During the 1970s and 1980s, as researchers continued to make
remarkable strides in organ transplantation, individual states began
to modify their versions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act to
facilitate organ donation.59 According to the Executive Committee
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which reconvened in 1984, the state modifications, while
necessary, led to increased uncertainty, thus undermining one of
the original objectives of the 1968 Act.60 Therefore, in 1987, the
Conference adopted a new version of the Uniform Anatomical
heart, it seems desirable to eliminate all possible question by specifically stating the
rights of and the priorities among the survivors." Id. cmt.
49. E.g., Silver, supra note 12, at 694; cf. Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp.
1551, 1564 (D. Kan. 1995) (stating that "[f]or whatever reason, whether it be meta-
physical, religious, or philosophical, society presently rejects the commercialization of
human organs and tissues and tolerates only an altruistic system of voluntary
donation").
50. 8A U.L.A. 99, § 2(b).
51. ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-19-42 (2000).
52. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-34-103 (West 2000).
53. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.175 (Michie 2000).
54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2902 (West 1999).
55. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.10102 (West 2000).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-58 (West 2000).
57. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (Consol. 2000).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-404 (2000).
59. See UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 21 (1993) (dis-
cussing state amendments allowing non-doctors to remove eyes and "address[ing]
specific emerging problems").
60. Id.
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Gift Act (the "1987 Act"), essentially replacing the existing
statute.61
The new law requires a designated hospital administrator to dis-
cuss organ donation with every person admitted to the hospital.62
The 1987 Act explicitly provides that a donor's unrevoked anatom-
ical gifts become irrevocable upon death, eliminating the need for
additional family consent.63 Moreover, when a patient with no
documented organ choice dies, the 1987 Act requires the adminis-
trator to ask family members to make an anatomical gift. 64 These
provisions are designed to increase organ supply by identifying po-
tential donors, respecting the donors' wishes, and simplifying the
anatomical gift process for family members.65
The 1987 Act also contains a provision authorizing a controver-
sial method for procuring additional organs, namely, by coroner
release. To understand this provision, it is first necessary to review
the Act's modified priority scheme, which is as follows:
(a) Any member of the following classes of persons, in the or-
der of priority listed, may make an anatomical gift of all or
part of the decedent's body for an authorized purpose, un-
less the decedent, at the time of death, has made an unre-
voked refusal to make that anatomical gift:
(1) the spouse of the decedent;
(2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent;
(3) either parent of the decedent;
(4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent;
(5) a grandparent of the decedent; and
(6) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of
death.66
The new scheme clarifies that family donations cannot be made
if a person in a prior class is available to make an anatomical gift
and/or if the person making the gift knows of a "refusal or contrary
indications" by the decedent or an objection by a person in the
same or prior class.67 In explaining the priority scheme, the Act
61. Id. at 22; Sullivan, supra note 27, at 25 (arguing that the "1987 version is not a
mere update of the 1968 act. It is a comprehensive revision, a replacement").
62. 8A U.L.A. 47, § 5(a) (requiring a designated person to "ask each patient who
is at least [18] years of age: 'Are you an organ or tissue donor?'").
63. Id. § 2(h).
64. Id. § 5(b) (stating that a "required request" should "be made with reasonable
discretion and sensitivity to the circumstances of the family").
65. Id. Prefatory Note.
66. Id. § 3(a).
67. Id. § 3(b).
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states that an individual's failure to make an anatomical gift does
not necessarily reflect an objection to organ donation.68
When the Conference revised the priority scheme, it added the
"grandparents" category and deleted the 1968 Act's residual cate-
gory, which had allowed organ donation by persons authorized to
dispose of the decedent's body.69 The Conference drafters re-
placed the residual category with a separate section specifically au-
thorizing a medical examiner, coroner, or other official to "release
and permit the removal of a part from a body within that official's
custody, for transplantation or therapy," provided that certain re-
quirements are met.70 First, an organ procurement facility must re-
quest the body part from the official, who must make a
"reasonable effort" to locate the decedent's medical records and
inform the individuals listed in the priority scheme.7' Second, the
official must not know of a decedent's "refusal or contrary indica-
tion" or a family member's objection to organ donation prior to the
removal.7 2 Third, the official must ensure that organ harvesting
does not interfere with an autopsy or investigation, and the body's
cosmetic appearance must be restored after the organ removal, if
necessary. 73 Finally, the 1987 Act allows a coroner or other official
to release and remove body parts from decedents who are not
within that official's custody, as long as the official complies with
the safeguards described above. 4
According to the 1987 Act's Comment, the coroner's release of
organs under the revised statute is "more limited" than the 1968
Act's residual authorization. 75 Thus, in theory, the refined provi-
sion should make it more difficult for a coroner to release organs
and tissues without express consent. However, this notion of re-
straint is undermined by the Conference's statement that, in bal-
ancing society's need for organs with the family's interest in the
body, the Conference decided to give greater weight to increased
organ procurement. 76 Moreover, in clarifying the coroner's "rea-
sonable effort" to learn of the decedent's or family's organ dona-
68. Id. § 3(e). The Comment notes that this provision is "based on the concept
that failure to act is ambiguous." Id.
69. Id. § 4 cmt.
70. Id. § 4(a).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 4(b).
75. Id. § 4 cmt.
76. Id. (stating that, in this section of the statute, the balance is "on the side of
increasing the size of the donor pool").
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tion wishes, the drafters of the 1987 Act emphasized that there is a
"very limited time available following death for the successful re-
covery of such critical tissues. ' 77 Therefore, if immediate removal
is necessary to maintain organ viability, the coroner may proceed,
provided that the decedent's records or next of kin cannot be lo-
cated within the very short period of time in which organ trans-
plantation is feasible.78 Expedience thus outweighs the need for
notice and actual consent.79
Because the 1987 Act expressly allows a coroner to release or-
gans in the absence of contrary notice, the statute seems to be
based on the presumption that decedents and/or their family mem-
bers would have consented to donation if given the opportunity.
Otherwise, the statute merely authorizes blatant organ conscrip-
tion to satisfy state needs, which seems anomalous in a democratic
society. Thus, based on the separate and explicit organ removal
authorization and the "free" state of American society, the coroner
release statute can be deemed a "strong" version of presumed con-
sent. The eighteen states that have adopted some version of the
coroner release statute include Arizona,80 California,81 Hawaii,82
Idaho,83 Indiana,84 Minnesota,85 Montana,86 New Mexico,87 Rhode
Island, 88 and Utah.89
77. Id. (citing the Comment to the 1968 Act).
78. Id.
79. One court has explained that "[ilt would be prohibitively costly in lost organ
transplants (and, consequently, human lives) to affirmatively undertake lengthy
searches for interested parties (as defined by statute) who may have a personal, moral
or religious objection to the organ harvesting." Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No.
97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at *5 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998).
80. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-842 (West 2000).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5 (West 2000). The statute defines a
"reasonable effort" as twelve hours of searching, unless the "useful life of the part
does not permit." Id.
82. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (Michie 2000).
83. IDAHO CODE § 39-3405 (Michie 2000).
84. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-2-16-4.5 (West 2001).
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West 2000). The statute does not include the
cosmetic restoration provision. Id.
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (2000).
87. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (Michie 2000).
88. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-4 (2000). The Rhode Island statute does not allow
organ removal from bodies that are not within the medical examiner's custody. Id.
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-28-5 (2000). Utah's provision expands on the uniform
law by permitting organ removal for "transplantation, therapy, medical or dental edu-
cation, research, or advancement of medical or dental science." Id. However, the
Utah statute does not permit non-custodial organ removal. Id.
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c. State Modifications
In adopting either the 1968 or 1987 version of the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act, individual state legislatures have modified their
priority schemes to include health care agents,90 friends, 91 and do-
mestic partners.92 Moreover, several states that have adopted the
1987 Act's revised priority scheme have not adopted the separate
coroner release provision, even though the revised scheme elimi-
nates the residual category.93 In these states, there is no express or
implied presumed consent authorization, and coroners should not
be able to remove organs without a donor's document of gift or the
family's approval.
The Texas state legislature has modified the 1987 Act by limiting
the coroner release provision. Under Texas law, a medical exam-
iner may remove organs from a decedent who died under circum-
stances requiring an inquest.94 However, to remove "visceral
organs," 95 the medical examiner must obtain consent from a family
member.96 If such a person cannot be identified and located within
four hours after the pronouncement of death, the medical exam-
iner may remove only nonvisceral organs and tissues.97 Thus, the
90. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-143 (2000) (adding a person with "durable power
of attorney" as the first category in the 1968 Act's priority scheme); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 65-3210 (1999) (amending the 1968 Act's priority scheme to include "an agent for
health care decisions" as the primary category, provided that the agent has specific
organ donation authorization); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:4 (2000) (modifying
the 1987 Act's priority scheme by including "a designated agent under the durable
power of attorney for health care"). The New Hampshire priority scheme also con-
tains the 1968 Act's residual category, even though the New Hampshire legislature
has adopted the separate coroner release statute. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:5.
91. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-503 (1999). Maryland's priority
scheme places a decedent's "friend or other relative" in the last category, and pro-
vides that the friend must swear out an affidavit before organ donation can be al-
lowed. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-3 (2000) (including "an adult who has
exhibited special care and concern for the decedent and who is familiar with the dece-
dent's values" as the final category in the priority scheme).
92. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-843 (2000) (including the "decedent's do-
mestic partner" as the sixth priority category, provided that the decedent was unmar-
ried and no other person had assumed financial responsibility for the decedent); see
also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-3 (Michie 2000) (placing the decedent's "spouse or
reciprocal beneficiary" in the first priority category).
93. E.g., 2000 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. 99-120 (West); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 451.557 (Michie 2000).
94. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 693.002 (Vernon 2000).
95. The Texas legislature has defined a "visceral organ" as any organ requiring a
support system to maintain viability. Id. § 693.001.
96. Id. § 693.003.
97. Id. Texas' current coroner release statute should not allow the release of all
organs, as occurred in the Arthur Forge Jr. case. See id.
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Texas statute, which recognizes a distinction between the relative
invasiveness of harvesting different body parts, seems to provide a
slightly higher degree of protection to unidentified decedents.
Other states have amended their anatomical gift statutes to in-
clude safeguards respecting the decedent's and family's religious
beliefs. In New Jersey, hospital administrators need not request
anatomical gifts from family members when there is reason to be-
lieve that the decedent's religious beliefs prohibited organ dona-
tion.98 Similarly, New York's statute forbids individuals listed in
the priority scheme from donating the decedent's organs when
there is evidence that such a gift would be contrary to the donor's
"religious or moral beliefs." 99 Under Iowa's coroner release stat-
ute, the medical examiner cannot harvest organs when the exam-
iner knows that the decedent's religion either relied on faith
healing or forbade organ donation. 1°°
In addition, some state legislatures have modified their anatomi-
cal gift laws to limit the applicability of coroner release to certain
body parts or tissues. Specifically, fifteen states, including Dela-
ware,1 1 Florida, 102 Georgia,'0 3 Kentucky, 04 Maryland, 0 5 Massa-
chusetts, 1 6 Ohio,0 7 and Pennsylvania, 108 allow coroners to remove
only the corneas or eyes from decedents based on presumed con-
sent,10 9 while Mississippi allows coroners to harvest a decedent's
98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-58.1 (West 2000). Wisconsin has a similar provision
limiting required request of family members because of religious or cultural objec-
tions to organ donation. Wis. STAT. § 157.06(5)(b)(3) (2000).
99. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (Consol. 2000). The New York statute also
forbids a donee from accepting donated organs or tissue when the donee has evidence
that such a gift is contrary to the decedent's religious or moral beliefs. Id.
100. IOwA CODE ANN. § 142C.4A (West 1999). California's priority scheme in-
cludes a similar exemption for decedents who are members of faith-healing religious
sects. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151 (West 2000).
101. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 4712 (1999).
102. FLA. STAT. ch. 732.9185 (2000).
103. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6 (2000). Georgia does require express consent for
whole eye removal. Id.
104. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.187 (Michie 2000).
105. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (1999).
106. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 113, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
107. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Anderson 2000).
108. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641 (2000).
109. See Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord
Blood for Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 517 (1999) (discussing the ways
in which some states "presume consent" for corneal removal by coroners); Erik S.
Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal
of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
528, 535 (1990) (detailing the requirements for "presumed consent" removal of cor-
neas and pituitary glands under state statutes).
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corneas, pituitary glands, or "other tissues.""'  The limited coroner
release statutes typically require a request for the cornea or
gland"' and a reasonable search for the decedent's next of kin or
medical records." 2 Furthermore, the coroner usually cannot pro-
ceed if he or she knows of a donation objection by the decedent or
the family members. 1 3 Finally, the decedent's post-mortem physi-
cal appearance must be restored after the corneal or gland
harvesting.1 4
2. Cases Addressing the Aftermath of Presumed Consent
Organ Harvesting
a. Property Interest in the Body
In Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,1 5 the Supreme
Court of Georgia became one of the first courts in the United
States to address the ramifications of presumed consent organ har-
vesting. Acting under Georgia's limited coroner release statute,
state-affiliated eye bank officials had removed the corneal tissue of
an infant during an autopsy.1 6 The parents of the infant, who had
died of sudden infant death syndrome, were not notified of the cor-
neal removal and thus not given an opportunity to object to the
procedure." 7 Ruling on the defendants' summary judgment mo-
tions, the court noted that early common law had not recognized a
property interest in the dead body.118 Over time, the American
courts created a "quasi-property right" to protect survivors' inter-
est in the decedent's body." 9 This limited right was "something
110. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (2000).
111. E.g., § 8641(A); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6(a)(1) (2000).
112. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 113, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (requiring a one-hour
"good faith effort" to locate next of kin before corneal removal); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-30-204(3) (2000) (allowing the "reasonable effort" to discover donation objec-
tions to terminate when "further delay of necessary procedures would violate the time
prescribed by existing medical standards to receive tissue for eyesight restoring
transplants").
113. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509.1(a)(4) (1999) (stating that the
medical examiner cannot proceed with corneal removal when he or she knows of the
decedent's religious objection); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60(B)(4) (Anderson
2000) (mandating that the coroner cannot proceed with corneal removal when he or
she knows of a family member's objection).
114. E.g., § 41-61-71(2)(b) (providing that the tissue removal must not interfere
with the "postmortem facial appearance").
115. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
116. Id. at 128.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Massey v. Duke Univ., 503 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (denying
defendants' summary judgment motion in emotional distress eye removal case and
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evolved out of thin air," a mere "fiction" designed to respect the
family members' feelings at a difficult time.1 20 Applying this rea-
soning, the Lavant court held that the eye bank officials did not
violate plaintiffs' due process rights, because the quasi-property
right does not rise to the level of constitutional protection. 121
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclu-
sion in Brotherton v. Cleveland.2 2 In Brotherton, plaintiff brought
a civil rights class action suit after her husband's corneas were re-
moved during an autopsy.' 23 Plaintiff had refused to make an ana-
tomical gift after her husband was pronounced dead; however, the
hospital did not inform the coroner's office of plaintiff's donation
objection.' 24 The coroner proceeded under Ohio's limited coroner
release statute and removed the husband's corneas 25 After learn-
ing of the removal, plaintiff sued in federal court, alleging a viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause. 126
In its opinion, the Brotherton court first discussed the require-
ments needed to sustain a due process action, namely, deprivation
of property under color of state law. 127 The court focused on
whether plaintiff's property interest in her husband's body could
rise to the level of a protected "legitimate claim of entitlement."'1 28
clarifying the family's quasi-property right as "not property in the commercial sense
but a right of possession for the purpose of burial") (citing Kyles v. Southern R.R., 61
S.E. 278 (N.C. 1908)); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan.
1995) (explaining the nature of the quasi-property right in allegedly unauthorized tis-
sue removal case by stating that "Kansas common law ... is no different from the
position universally held by other states which recognizes no property right, commer-
cial or material, in the corpse itself but only a right of possession in order to dispose of
the corpse appropriately") (citations omitted).
120. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d at 128 (citing W.L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (5th ed. 1984)).
121. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d at 128; cf Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-
CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at *7 - *8 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998) (describing family mem-
bers' "de minimis" property interest in a dead body as a "low right on the constitu-
tional totem pole," and finding that the right is sufficiently protected by Missouri's
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986)
(finding that, because next of kin have only a "limited right to possess the body for
burial purposes," presumed consent corneal harvesting did not amount to a taking of
private property, and noting that "the right to bring an action in tort does not necessa-
rily invoke constitutional protections").
122. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 478.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 479.
127. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981)).
128. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
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Although Ohio did not formally identify a quasi-property right in
the body, the court found that several state cases did recognize a
family's right to possess and keep undisturbed a body before bur-
ial.12 9 The court also cited as authority the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, which specifically allows family members to control dis-
posal of a decedent's body by making an anatomical gift. 130 The
court concluded that this collection of property rights "form a sub-
stantial interest in the dead body, regardless of Ohio's classification
of that interest.' 13 1 Furthermore, the court determined that the
family's property rights rose to the level of a legitimate claim of
entitlement under federal law.' 32 Therefore, the court reversed the
lower court's dismissal of the case and held that the Due Process
Clause protected plaintiff's property interest in her dead husband's
corneas.
133
A vigorous dissent by Justice Joiner criticized the majority's rec-
ognition of plaintiff's property right, as "Ohio law has made it very
clear that there is no property right in a dead person's body.' 34
The dissent noted that the state cases cited by the majority rejected
such a right.135 Moreover, the dissent argued that the Uniform An-
atomical Gift Act, which only details a procedure for donating or-
gans, "make[s] no effort to reexamine underlying property rights in
the body of the decedent.' 1 36 The dissent concluded that plaintiff's
"virtually nonexistent" rights did not warrant constitutional
protection. 37
When courts do find a quasi-property right in the dead body,
they must then address the issue of damages for prevailing plain-
tiffs, as the Court of Appeals of Georgia did in Bauer v. North
Fulton Medical Center.138 In this case, plaintiff refused to donate
any of her husband's organs after he died of a heart attack.139 De-
spite this refusal, Georgia Eye Bank, Inc., acting under the state's
129. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 480.
130. Id. at 482.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995)
(finding that next of kin may bring a due process property claim after presumed con-
sent corneal harvesting based solely on the fact that the family's rights in the dead
body "closely correspond with the 'bundle of rights' by which property has been tradi-
tionally defined").
134. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 483 (Joiner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 484.
138. 527 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
139. Id. at 242.
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limited coroner release statute, removed eye tissue from the dece-
dent's corpse.14 Although the court affirmed dismissal of the med-
ical malpractice claim,'141 it upheld plaintiff's quasi-property right
to possess her husband's body for "proper handling and burial.' '1 42
Nevertheless, the court's discussion of compensatory damages
emphasized the limited nature of the quasi-property right and
stressed that the right is not pecuniary. 43 Rather, the next of kin's
limited possessory rights only "ensure that the corpse is orderly
handled and laid to rest, nothing more.' 1 44 Otherwise, the court
feared the "absurd and morbid process" of affixing a dollar amount
to human body parts. 45 As plaintiff had no pecuniary interest in
her husband's body, the court held that her claim for conversion
could not be sustained. 46 Moreover, the court determined that a
bailment claim was impossible, because no court should place a fi-
nancial figure on the diminished value of a corpse. 47 The court
further held that plaintiff's breach of contract action, based on an
implied contract with the hospital to properly handle her husband's
dead body, was also untenable. 48 The court reasoned that it could
not set restitution damages for breach of contract because the cor-
neal tissue had no numerical value. 149 The court did, however, be-
lieve that plaintiff could recover nominal damages for any extra
costs she may have incurred in burying her husband, provided she
could attribute such costs to the corneal tissue removal. 50
b. Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty
The seminal case discussing non-property claims following pre-
sumed consent organ harvesting is State v. Powell.'5' In each of the
140. Id.
141. Id. at 242-43. The court held that medical malpractice claims are not applica-
ble to dead body cases, because "it is an impossibility to kill or injure someone who is
already deceased." Id. at 243.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The court stated that "impos[ing] a pecuniary value on the flesh itself...
would make the strangest thing on earth that much stranger." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 245.
149. Id. at 244-45. The court also noted that Georgia law makes it a misdemeanor
to sell eye tissue, thus making any contract of sale illegal. Id. at 245.
150. Id. The court specifically discussed additional mortuary charges incurred
when preparing a body without eyes for burial, as well as any increased costs related
to subsequent funeral delays. Id.
151. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
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individual cases consolidated in Powell, a medical examiner, acting
under Florida's limited coroner release statute, removed the cor-
neal tissue from decedents without first providing notice to or ob-
taining consent from family members.152  In ruling on the
constitutionality of the coroner release statute, the court "beg[an]
with the premise that a person's constitutional rights terminate at
death."'15 3 Accordingly, the court only addressed constitutional
rights held by the decedent's next of kin.'54
In quickly dismissing the donor's constitutional rights, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court failed to discuss when the determination of
death, for constitutional purposes, is made. In the context of organ
donation, a person must be sustained by life support, both before
and during organ harvesting, in order to maintain organ viability
for transplant purposes. 55 As the case of Texas' Arthur Forge Jr.
demonstrates, an individual can be maintained in such a condition
for several days. 5 6 Thus, during the decision-making process and
the actual organ removal, the donor remains a living, breathing or-
ganism with a beating heart and the ability to digest food, excrete
waste, and, possibly, bear children. 57
Moreover, although donors must be declared "brain dead"
before organ harvesting can begin, studies show that up to twenty
percent of so-called brain-dead patients still register electrical ac-
tivity on electroencephalograms, thus demonstrating some degree
of brain activity.' 58 Research also has revealed that the donor's
heart rate and blood pressure often rise upon organ incision, indi-
cating that, on some level, the person can respond to stimuli and
perhaps even feel pain.' 59 Therefore, depending upon a state's def-
inition of death, the presumed consent organ donor may be viewed
152. Id. at 1189.
153. Id. at 1190 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980); Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1979)).
154. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1190.
155. See Robert D. Truog, Is it Time to Abandon Brain Death?, in THE ETHICS OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 24, 27 (rejecting the cardiorespiratory stan-
dard as the sole method for determining death, as this approach would "make it virtu-
ally impossible to obtain vital organs in a viable condition for transplantation, since
under current laws it is generally necessary for these organs to be removed from a
heart-beating donor").
156. Huff, supra note 6.
157. Barbara B. Ott, Defining and Redefining Death, in THE ETHICs OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 16, 18 (discussing the physiological status of brain-
dead patients) (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 19 (analyzing the condition of brain-dead patients under "standard crite-
ria") (citation omitted).
159. See Truog, supra note 155, at 26.
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as a living person, at least for the limited purpose of analyzing his
or her constitutional rights.
In Powell, the Florida court focused solely on family rights, since
it had assumed that the individual organ donors were dead when
their corneal tissue was removed. 6 ' In its decision, the court re-
jected plaintiffs' argument that the corneal release statute violated
the family's personal liberty by intruding on a fundamental right to
control the decedent's remains. 16  In particular, the court refused
to extend the Supreme Court's protections of "freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life" to unauthorized organ or tissue
removal. 62 The court stated that protected autonomy is limited to
"existing, ongoing relationships among living persons," and thus is
inapplicable to the next of kin's "tort claim for interference with
burial.' 1 63 Moreover, the court stressed that all governmental in-
trusions into an individual's personal affairs are not necessarily vio-
lations of privacy, especially when the contested statute involves
public health concerns.' 64 Therefore, finding no fundamental right,
the court applied a rational basis review and determined that Flor-
ida's corneal release statute is constitutional, because it "rationally
promotes the permissible state objective of restoring sight to the
blind. 1' 65 This conclusion was foreseeable, as the court had pref-
aced its holding with a lengthy discussion of the need for corneal
tissue, 66 the time constraints involved in corneal transplanta-
tion, 67 and the "infinitesimally small intrusion" into the decedent's
body required for corneal removal. 68
The dissent by Justice Shaw criticized the majority opinion for
essentially holding that the state may do as it pleases with a dead
body, provided that the corpse is eventually turned over to the next
160. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1986).
161. Id. at 1193. The court, citing a lack of evidence in the record, also rejected
plaintiffs' liberty claims based on their religious beliefs. Id.
162. Id.; see also Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting plaintiffs' privacy claim in unauthorized corneal removal
case and holding that, although the privacy right includes the right to make decisions
regarding bodily integrity, this personal right ends with the death of the individual).
163. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193.
164. See id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
165. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193-94.
166. Id. at 1190-91. The court specifically addressed the need for expedient corneal
transplants for newborn infants, as blind infants must receive corneas before their
brains have "learn[ed] not to see." Id. at 1191.
167. Id. (stating that corneal tissue only remains viable for ten hours after death).
168. Id. (noting that the corpse's eyes must be capped to restore the decedent's
appearance, regardless of whether corneal removal is performed).
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of kin.169 The dissent argued that the family's right to possess and
control the decedent's body, recognized "since time immemorial,"
rests upon "religious, moral, and philosophical grounds" that were
never completely forfeited to the state.170 The dissent broadly con-
ceived the right of privacy protected by Florida's Constitution as
the right to be let alone. 71 Thus, according to the dissent, the fam-
ily's right to possess and control the decedent's body and "to honor
and celebrate the decedent's life and death through appropriate
commemoration is a quintessential privacy right.' '1 72
II. UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVACY, AUTONOMY,
AND LIBERTY FRAMEWORK
A resolution to the controversy surrounding presumed consent
organ donation laws requires an examination and interpretation of
the United States Supreme Court's evolving conception of individ-
ual and family-based privacy, autonomy, and liberty. The Supreme
Court has protected these important constitutional rights through
decisions in a series of cases addressing such diverse topics as con-
traception, abortion, homosexuality, education, and marriage. In
addition, the complex presumed consent organ donation debate is
further informed by a discussion of conflicting theories of jurispru-
dence, which seek to define the precise nature and scope of consti-
tutionally protected privacy, autonomy, and liberty.
A. Supreme Court Cases
1. Personal Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty
This section provides a brief overview of the United States Su-
preme Court's development of individual privacy rights, for subse-
quent application to presumed consent organ donation laws. The
Court initially addressed a right of personal privacy in several cases
involving the use of contraceptives. In Poe v. Ullman,73 the Su-
preme Court dismissed on procedural grounds. a case involving
169. Id. at 1195 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1195-96.
172. Id. at 1196; cf Higgins v. McDonnell, No. 71341, 1997 WL 253150, at *3 (Ohio
App. 8th, May 15, 1997) (noting family members' frequent "shock and anguish" fol-
lowing unauthorized corneal removal, and stating that "[p]ermitting the disfigurement
of a loved one's body ... is a personal decision that should be left to the decedent
during life or the next-of-kin after death") (citing Brotherton v. Cleveland, 733 F.
Supp. 56, 60 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev'd Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.
1991)).
173. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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Connecticut's criminalization of the use of birth control. 174 Justice
Harlan dissented from the dismissal, arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty protection 175 encompasses a right of pri-
vacy.176 According to Harlan, Fourteenth Amendment liberty in-
cludes the right to be free "from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints.' 77 Thus, Harlan argued
that privacy of the home, which is "a most fundamental aspect of
liberty," forbids the state from intruding upon the intimate details
of married life by banning contraception. 78
Four years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,179 the Supreme
Court agreed to review the Connecticut contraception provision. 180
In its decision, the Court found that a right of privacy predates the
creation of the Bill of Rights and the formation of our political
parties.' 8' In analyzing the Constitution, the Court stated that the
protections of the Bill of Rights have "penumbras," which expand
on enumerated constitutional guarantees. 82 The Court held that
the right of privacy, which is included within these penumbras, for-
bids a broad law banning the use of contraceptives by married
couples. 183
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,84 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts law
that forbade anyone from providing birth control information to
unmarried people. 185 Using the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, 86 the Court struck down the statute because it
created an unfair distinction between married and single per-
sons. 187 The Court explained that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that the state cannot deprive individ-
uals of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
176. Poe, 367 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 543 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 548.
179. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 486.
182. Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
183. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. Justice Harlan concurred in the majority's judg-
ment, holding that the right of privacy is instead derived from Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
184. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
185. Id. at 440-41.
186. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (forbidding a state from denying equal protec-
tion of the laws to people within its jurisdiction).
187. Baird, 405 U.S. at 447.
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free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."' 88 Thus, the Court expanded on Griswold by ex-
pressly conceptualizing the right of privacy as a right of autonomy
in making important personal decisions.
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, 89 the Supreme Court re-
turned to the issue of privacy by examining a Texas statute that
criminalized non-medically necessary abortions. 9 ° Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun explained that although the Constitu-
tion does not specifically mention a right of personal privacy, the
Court had, over time, found such a right to exist in the First,191
Fourth, 92 Fifth, 93 Ninth,194 and Fourteenth 95 Amendments, as
well as in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. 196 Blackmun de-
scribed the right of privacy as protecting intimate relationships and
personal decision making, including the decision to conceive chil-
dren. 97 Using this analysis, the Court concluded that, regardless of
its roots, 98 the privacy right is clearly "broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.''1 99
Justice Blackmun further clarified his conception of the right of
privacy in a dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick °.2 ° In up-
holding the constitutionality of Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, the
Bowers majority had narrowly examined whether individuals have
a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
clause to engage in homosexual sodomy.20' Blackmun criticized
188. Id. at 453 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190. Id. at 117-18.
191. The First Amendment prohibits the state from establishing a religion, protects
the free exercise of religion, and secures freedom of speech, the press, peaceable as-
sembly, and petition of the government. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
192. The Fourth Amendment generally protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
193. Under the Fifth Amendment, criminal defendants are protected from self-in-
crimination. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
194. The Ninth Amendment provides that certain unenumerated rights are retained
by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
195. Specifically, Justice Blackmun is referring to the concept of ordered liberty
inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
196. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
197. Id. (citations omitted).
198. See id. at 153 (noting that while the Court finds the right of privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause, the district court had instead utilized the
Ninth Amendment to protect personal privacy).
199. Id.
200. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 190.
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the majority for using such a restrictive analytical framework and
instead argued that the case involved "'the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the
right to be let alone.' 2 0 2 According to Blackmun, the Court had
delineated both a decisional and a spatial right of privacy, with the
decisional right encompassing deeply personal choices, including
the decision to marry and raise a family.2 °3 Blackmun argued that
these choices, which "form so central a part of an individual's
life,"204 are protected because the right of privacy recognizes the
"'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to
society as a whole."' 20 5
Six years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 °6 the Court
seemed to adopt Justice Blackmun's formulation of the right of pri-
vacy. In this case, the Court again confronted the abortion issue,
this time by reviewing Pennsylvania's abortion statute, which had
included provisions mandating a twenty-four hour waiting period
and parental consent for minors.20 7 The Court analyzed the statute
under the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause, beginning with
the premise that there is "a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter. '20 8 The Court reviewed cases that rec-
ognized a right of privacy and concluded that "[i]t is settled now, as
it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the
Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a per-
202. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
203. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 204.
205. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)). In his dissent in Bowers, Justice
Stevens expands on the conception of decisional privacy by citing one of his prior
appellate court decisions:
[These cases deal] with the individual's right to make certain unusually im-
portant decisions that will affect his own, or his family's, destiny. The Court
has referred to such decisions as implicating 'basic values,' as being 'funda-
mental,' and as being dignified by history and tradition. The character of the
Court's language in these cases brings to mind the origins of the American
heritage of freedom-the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes
certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his
own life intolerable. Guided by history, our tradition of respect for the dig-
nity of individual choice in matters of conscience . . .federal judges have
accepted the responsibility for recognition and protection of these rights in
appropriate cases.
478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp.,
523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
206. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
207. Id. at 844.
208. Id. at 847.
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son's most basic decisions about family and parenthood ... as well
as bodily integrity. 20 9
In developing its opinion, the Court returned to Justice Harlan's
conception of the Fourteenth Amendment, as embodied by his dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman.21 ° The Court elaborated on Harlan's origi-
nal argument, stating that constitutional liberty protects "personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education. ' 211 Moreover, the
Court clarified the nature of this personal autonomy, explaining
that:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.212
The Casey opinion also builds upon Roe by explicitly extending
the right of privacy to protect a person's body from certain un-
wanted governmental intrusions.1 3 Prior Supreme Court decisions
had delineated early conceptions of this right of bodily integrity.
For example, in Jacobsen v. Massachusetts,21 4 the Court upheld as
constitutional a law mandating smallpox vaccinations.215 However,
the Court recognized an "inherent right" to care for one's body
and health and emphasized that a sphere exists within which a per-
son "may assert the supremacy of his own will" against the state's
interference.1 6 Thus, in the context of the case, the Jacobsen
Court seemed to recognize a right of bodily integrity, albeit one
209. Id. at 849 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun explicitly emphasized this
point in his separate opinion, stating that the Court had reaffirmed "the long recog-
nized rights of privacy and bodily integrity." Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
210. See id. at 848-49 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
211. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
212. Id. But cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06, 727-28 (1997) (re-
jecting a right to commit physician-assisted suicide and stating that Casey's autonomy
guarantees "[do] not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, inti-
mate, and personal decisions are so protected ....") (citation omitted).
213. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (declaring a right of bodily integrity and mentioning
Roe v. Wade).
214. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
215. Id. at 11-12, 39.
216. Id. at 26, 29.
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necessarily limited by society's legitimate public health concerns
and reasonable regulations.
Later, in Rochin v. California,2 17 the Court reversed the convic-
tion of a man from whom the state had physically extracted vital
evidence by pumping his stomach. 18 The Court found the state's
egregious conduct to violate the Due Process Clause, as "[i]llegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, [and] the forcible extraction of
his stomach contents" were "methods too close to the rack and
screw" to pass constitutional muster.219 The Court distinguished
this case from Jacobsen by focusing on the inviolability of a per-
son's body against particularly invasive state intrusions.
More recently, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Public Health,2 ° the Court assumed that a competent person has a
liberty interest in rejecting lifesaving nutrition and hydration.22'
However, the Court upheld a heightened evidentiary standard
when a surrogate decides to refuse such treatment on behalf of an
incompetent person, partially out of respect for the personal auton-
omy involved in making the "choice between life and death. '222 In
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor clarified that the liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment is partly derived from prior
decisions protecting against state intrusions into the body. 23 Ac-
cording to O'Connor, liberty is "inextricably entwined with our
idea of physical freedom and self-determination," making certain
governmental "incursions into the body repugnant" to the Due
Process Clause.2 4
In sum, the Supreme Court has found individual privacy to in-
clude a right of personal autonomy in making such crucial life deci-
sions as the choice to use contraceptives or undergo an abortion.
However, the Court's opinions emphasize that the right to deci-
sion-making autonomy is not limited solely to the reproductive
sphere; rather, as enunciated in Casey, autonomy extends to ensure
that people's intimate life decisions can be made free from govern-
mental interference. The Court also has determined that the right
217. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
218. Id. at 174.
219. Id. at 172.
220. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
221. Id. at 279 & n.7. The Court does not believe that the basis for the right lies in
the realm of privacy. Id.
222. Id. at 281.
223. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224. Id.
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of personal privacy encompasses a right to bodily integrity, thus
protecting the physical self from certain unwarranted state intru-
sions. Overall, the Court has identified various clauses of the Con-
stitution as the basis for the privacy right. While some privacy
decisions focus on the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, others utilize
the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet regardless of
its source, the Court has found the personal privacy right to be
fundamental.
2. Family Rights
This section discusses the United States Supreme Court's protec-
tion of the rights of family members in making important family-
related decisions, as an understanding of these rights is critical in
analyzing presumed consent organ donation laws. The Supreme
Court has long recognized parents' freedom to raise and educate
their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska,2 5 the Court responded to
World War I era xenophobia by overturning a teacher's conviction
for instructing a child in the German language.226 The Court found
that Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes a parent's right to
"establish a home and bring up children . . . according to the dic-
tates of [one's] own conscience. "227
In the related case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,228 several paro-
chial and private schools in Oregon challenged a state law mandat-
ing public education for children ages eight to sixteen.229 The
Court held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause, as it
unreasonably interfered with parents' and guardians' liberty to di-
rect the upbringing and education of their children.23 ° Moreover,
the Court feared the standardizing effect of compulsory public edu-
cation, noting that a "child is not the mere creature of the State."'23 1
The Court has also recognized the important family-oriented
right to bear children. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,232 the Court re-
viewed an Oklahoma statute requiring certain criminals to be ster-
225. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
226. Id. at 403.
227. Id. at 399.
228. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
229. Id. at 529-33.
230. Id. at 534-35. Interestingly, both Meyer and Pierce have been subsequently
construed as First Amendment cases. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (stating that both cases hold that the State may not restrain education, as this
violates the "spirit" of the First Amendment).
231. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
232. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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ilized z33 The Court began its decision by stating that the case
involved a most critical area of human rights, namely, the right to
have offspring. 34 The court also noted that "marriage and procre-
ation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
human race." 235 Thus, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected this fundamental
right to have children, making the Oklahoma law's distinctions be-
tween certain categories of criminals unconstitutional.
2 36
The Court further developed the rights of the family in Loving v.
Virginia.2 37 In Loving, the Court reviewed Virginia's anti-miscege-
nation statute, which had prohibited interracial marriage.238 The
Court determined that the statute infringed upon individual liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, as it violated a person's
freedom to marry.239 The Court held that this right to marry, as
first enunciated in Skinner, was "essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. 1240 Moreover, the Court stated that the
highly personal decision to marry must be made free from govern-
mental interference. 41
In Moore v. East Cleveland,242 the Court attempted to clarify the
rights of the family in its review of a local ordinance limiting the
occupancy of certain housing units to the nuclear family.2 43 The
ordinance specifically prohibited grandparents from living with
their own grandchildren, when the grandchildren were cousins
rather than siblings.244 A majority of the Court declared the law
unconstitutional, with a plurality of justices focusing on the Four-
teenth Amendment's protection of the family.245 The plurality
cited a line of Court decisions recognizing "that freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. ' 246 Accordingly,
the plurality held that the Constitution protects the "sanctity of the
233. Id. at 535.
234. Id. at 536.
235. Id. at 541.
236. Id.
237. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id. at 12; cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause protects the fundamental character of the right to marry).
240. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
241. Id.
242. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
243. Id. at 495-96.
244. Id. at 496.
245. Id. at 499.
246. Id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
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family" because of the family's prominent role in American history
and tradition.247 The plurality further emphasized that a family's
choice of living arrangements is a personal decision for the family,
which cannot be "standardized" by the state's limited conception
of what constitutes an appropriate family unit.248
An examination of these cases, as well as an analysis of Gris-
wold, Roe, and Casey, demonstrates that the Court has extended
the protections of the Constitution to important family decisions,
including the choice to marry, conceive and bear offspring, and di-
rect the upbringing of one's children. Furthermore, the Court has
guaranteed the right of family integrity, forbidding the state from
unreasonably intruding upon the autonomous family by dictating
living arrangements. Thus, the Court has used the Constitution's
liberty clause and the right of privacy to create a protected sphere
of family life, within which critical life decisions relating to the fam-
ily can be made free from the domineering influence of the state.
B. Theories of Jurisprudence
1. Liberty and Autonomy
The writings of jurisprudential theorists also are useful in analyz-
ing the constitutionality of presumed consent organ donation laws.
This section discusses the works of several commentators whose
theories help clarify the nature of protected individual and family-
based rights. In his seminal treatise On Liberty, John Stuart Mill
writes that the state is only justified in regulating people's behav-
ior, and thus interfering with their liberty, when such interference
is necessary to prevent distinct harm to others.249 Therefore, indi-
viduals have complete freedom over their own minds and bodies,25 °
and the state cannot paternalistically intervene into private lives
simply because it believes it is acting in a person's best interests.25'
In addition, Mill believes that human liberty encompasses absolute
freedom of conscience, including the critical right to "fram[e] the
plan of our life to suit our own character. ' 252 Thus, provided a
person's conduct does not violate a specific public duty or injure
247. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
248. Id. at 505-06 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
249. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 259, 259 (Joel Feinberg
& Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).
250. Id. (stating that the individual is sovereign over himself). Mill also writes that
each person "is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual." Id. at 260-61.
251. Id. at 259.
252. Id. at 260.
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others, society must respect the individual's right of self-determina-
tion, even if the person makes decisions that run contrary to soci-
ety's prevailing belief system.253 As Mill notes, when the majority
imposes its will by regulating a person's "self-regarding conduct,"
that public opinion, as embodied by law, "is quite as likely to be
wrong as right. ' 254 Moreover, according to Mill, a society that en-
gages in such coercive regulation cannot be deemed truly free, re-
gardless of its form of government, because it does not respect
individual rights.255
In his analysis of Mill's conception of liberty, commentator Ger-
ald Dworkin states that governments often utilize "impure pater-
nalism" when the only means of protecting one group's welfare is
by restricting the freedom of a second set of people. 6 Dworkin
further argues that governments may engage in "pure paternal-
ism," defined as benefiting people through restriction of their own
freedom,257 when such restriction "preserves and enhances for the
individual his ability to rationally consider and carry out his own
decisions. '258 Dworkin writes that the law may act as an "insur-
ance policy" by protecting people against nonrational and far-
reaching decisions, as well as against choices made under social or
psychological pressure.2 5 9 However, Dworkin believes that the
government bears a heavy burden in justifying its need for pater-
nalistic legislation.26 ° In particular, Dworkin stresses that "[i]f
there is an alternative way of accomplishing the desired end with-
out restricting liberty although it may involve great expense, incon-
venience, et cetera, the society must adopt it."261
2. Privacy
Theorists have vehemently disagreed about the nature and scope
of the right of privacy. For example, Hyman Gross argues that the
right of privacy is limited to informational privacy, that is, the right
of individuals to control public knowledge of their private af-
253. Id. at 264-65.
254. Id. at 265 (noting that, when government interferes "with purely personal con-
duct ... the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place").
255. Id. at 260.
256. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 249, at 271,
273.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 280.
259. Id. at 278-79.
260. Id. at 280.
261. Id.
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fairs. 62 In particular, Gross believes that privacy encompasses two
classes of information: 1) personal facts, including identity, habits,
and interests; and 2) "private matter ... about our lives," defined
as a person's opinions, goals, and feelings.263 Moreover, Gross
states that the separate issue of autonomy, which is the govern-
ment's attempt to regulate, rather than learn about, personal af-
fairs, must not be confused with the very limited right of
informational privacy. 26
However, other critics argue that the right of privacy expands
beyond the informational realm. Judith Wagner Decew criticizes
narrow conceptions of privacy because they do not protect against
physical access to the person and his or her individual activities.265
Wagner Decew distinguishes liberty and privacy by stating that a
"subset of autonomy cases" involves liberty because of a "concern
over decision-making power, whereas privacy is at stake because of
the nature of the decision. '266
Moreover, Wagner Decew defines privacy by using tort law con-
cepts.267 Wagner Decew thus "characterize[s] the realm of the pri-
vate as whatever is not generally, that is, according to a reasonable
person under normal circumstances, or according to certain social
conventions, a legitimate concern of others because of the threat of
scrutiny or judgment and the potential problems following from
them. '268 Utilizing this definition, Wagner Decew concludes that
privacy is invaded by unjustified interferences into certain types of
personal information and activities.269
Some commentators have also conceptualized the privacy right
as a guarantee against the dominating hand of the state. For exam-
ple, Jed Rubenfeld argues that privacy is the "fundamental free-
dom not to have one's life too totally determined by a
progressively more normalizing state. '27 ° Rubenfeld fears the
"creeping totalitarianism" of a government striving to direct the
262. Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 708, 708-10 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
263. Id. at 710.
264. Id. at 714.
265. Judith Wagner Decew, The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics, in THE NA-
TURE AND PROCESS OF LAW, supra note 262, at 715, 720.
266. Id. at 723. Wagner Decew argues that the right of privacy includes some of
John Stuart Mill's protected self-regarding actions, while excluding others. Id. at 723-
24.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 726.
269. Id.
270. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).
845
846 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
very manner in whicf individuals choose to live their lives.27' Us-
ing this analytical framework, Rubenfeld construes Pierce and
Meyer as limiting the state's ability to standardize children, while
he views the abortion decisions as guarding against state-deter-
mined compulsory motherhood.272
Similarly, James E. Fleming believes that the Constitutional right
of privacy protects "deliberative autonomy," which includes the
freedom to make decisions about both external justice and inter-
nal, personal values.273 Deliberative autonomy builds upon the un-
derlying freedoms of conscience and association, 274 and "reserve[s]
to persons the power to deliberate about and decide how to live
their own lives, concerning certain matters that are unusually im-
portant or significant for such personal self-governance, over a
complete life."' 275 Like Rubenfeld's thesis, Fleming's concept of
deliberative autonomy protects against the overwhelming influence
of the state by preserving the sanctity of individual decision making
and personal sovereignty.
IH. APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO
PRESUMED CONSENT ORGAN DONATION
As previously discussed, most state and federal courts address
presumed consent organ donation controversies by examining the
dead body as property. 6 A review of these cases illustrates the
problems inherent in analyzing the ramifications of presumed con-
sent organ harvesting within a restrictive property framework.
First, it demeans human dignity to treat a person's body as a sack
of flesh and bone awaiting assignment to an owner. Surely the
family members do not view their deceased loved one as a mere
piece of property, no different from a house or car. Second, as in
Brotherton, courts often must resort to a liberal construction of
contrary precedent and/or unwarranted extrapolations from proce-
dural law in order to manipulate a dead body case to fit within the
legal constructions of property. 7  Moreover, courts seeking to
compensate decedent's relatives for the pain and anguish of unau-
271. Id.
272. Id. at 785-87.
273. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31
(1995).
274. Id. at 36.
275. Id. at 32-33.
276. Supra Part I.B.2.a.
277. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 483-84 (6th Cir. 1991) (Joiner, J.,
dissenting).
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thorized organ harvesting must at least address the grotesque and
farcical practice of placing a dollar amount on the human body. In
the end, as shown by Bauer's nominal award for extra burial costs,
even when a court recognizes that presumed consent harvesting
has infringed upon a quasi-property right in the dead body, it can
only provide a very limited and ultimately unsatisfactory remedy to
compensate damages.278 Therefore, recognizing the artificial re-
strictions of the property context, this Note analyzes presumed
consent organ donation laws within the constitutional framework
of individual and family-based privacy, autonomy, and liberty, with
the goal of providing a more reasonable resolution to this problem.
A. Individual Rights
Because viable organ removal requires a living, breathing donor
with a beating heart, presumed consent organ donation implicates
the donor's constitutional rights, despite the Powell court's con-
trary conclusion. 79 This Note analyzes individual rights by utiliz-
ing Judith Wagner Decew's broad definition of privacy as an
unjustified interference into a person's activities, rather than as a
limited protection of information.8 0 Wagner Decew's definition is
most consistent with the Court's privacy decisions, which have in-
cluded such non-informational subjects as abortion and contracep-
tion. Moreover, Wagner Decew's definition provides a helpful
construct for applying privacy decisions made in other contexts to
the presumed consent organ donation debate.
In identifying privacy violations, Wagner Decew uses a reasona-
ble person standard and examines the potential problems arising
from external scrutiny into the private realm.28' In the case of pre-
sumed consent organ harvesting, a reasonable person would likely
find organ and tissue removal to be a deeply personal matter, sim-
ply based on the government's limited right of access to a person's
body. For example, the Casey opinion expressly states that the
protections of liberty encompass bodily integrity,282 expanding
upon prior Court decisions that guarded against particularly vio-
lent governmental intrusions into the body. The unauthorized har-
vesting of organs and tissues is highly invasive, as it requires the
278. But cf. Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the nature of the constitutionally protected property right in a relative's dead
body is not determined by the manner in which damages are assessed).
279. Supra Part I.B.2.b.
280. Wagner Decew, supra note 265, at 726.
281. Id.
282. 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
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state to enter the person's body and physically remove the machin-
ery of human life. Even corneal removal, hailed as minimally inva-
sive by the Powell court, 83 still involves an external intrusion upon
the body and the forcible removal of tissue. Harvesting is thus dif-
ferent from the mandatory smallpox vaccinations that were upheld
in the Jacobsen decision, because vaccinations only require a quick
prick of the skin rather than the physical extraction of human body
parts.
Furthermore, the Jacobsen opinion could at least be justified by
a real health emergency, namely, the need to protect others from
the deadly contagion of smallpox. Using John Stuart Mill's thesis
of self-regarding actions,284 the smallpox vaccinations were permis-
sible state interferences into liberty, because they were necessary
to prevent a distinct harm to others. Specifically, during a smallpox
epidemic, an unvaccinated person likely will spread a highly conta-
gious virus, causing illness and death to others, unless the state acts
to protect its citizens. Presumed consent organ donation, on the
other hand, is not a preventative measure designed to ensure that
the affected individual refrains from injuring others. Rather, pre-
sumed consent harvesting, like Gerald Dworkin's concept of im-
pure paternalism,285 involves the state's affirmative removal of one
person's body part to benefit some unknown other person. Al-
though such altruism, when voluntary, is to be commended, it is
certainly not required in a democratic society. Of course, Mill
writes that a society that engages in such compulsion is not truly
free. 28
6
Returning to Wagner Decew's definition of privacy, she next ar-
gues that state intrusions into the personal realm are unjustified
when there is a threat of external scrutiny and its corresponding
problems.287 With presumed consent harvesting, the danger lies in
its violation of personal autonomy. In Casey, the Supreme Court
clarified its prior privacy decisions as creating a sphere of individ-
ual autonomy within which a person can make fundamental life
decisions, including the right to define his or her own existence.288
The Court's conception of the autonomy right is thus consistent
with Mill's belief that liberty includes the right to idiosyncratically
283. 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
284. Mill, supra note 249, at 259.
285. Dworkin, supra note 256, at 273.
286. Mill, supra note 249, at 260.
287. Wagner Decew, supra note 265, at 726.
288. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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plan one's life, as well as James E. Fleming's notion of deliberative
autonomy as the right of self-governance.
While the Court's privacy/autonomy decisions have dealt with
contraception and abortion, one can see parallels to presumed con-
sent organ donation. First, there is obvious similarity in the right of
bodily integrity, as discussed above.289 Second, the decision to
have children, implicated by both contraception and abortion, in-
volves the right to set individual priorities and determine when,
how, and even if one wants to become a parent. The Court has
emphatically stated that this choice belongs to the individual. Or-
gan donation involves a similar decision to set individual priorities
(religion, altruism) and determine when (brain death, certain types
of injuries), how (visceral organs, corneas), and even if (no dona-
tion at all) one wants to become a donor. Thus, both decisions
encompass a personal choice to control one's body and determine
one's own course of existence.
Moreover, the state cannot assume organ donation decision
making as an insurance policy against ill-advised and far-reaching
decisions, as Dworkin argues.29° The donation decision will always
be a far-reaching one, as the time and place of death is inevitably
uncertain. Furthermore, although society would clearly benefit
from increased donations, an individual who disagrees with organ
donation has made a personal decision, based on his or her own
values and priorities. As there are no guidelines for the exercise of
personal autonomy, the state cannot deem one's choice irrational
simply because it runs contrary to society's expressed interests.
In sum, presumed consent organ donation, in which the state as-
sumes control over an otherwise privately made decision, infringes
upon the Constitution's guarantee of personal privacy. In addition,
the so-called safeguards of presumed consent laws, including organ
request, reasonable search, and lack of knowledge of objection,29'
are inadequate measures of due process. As the Arthur Forge Jr.
incident demonstrates, there is some question as to the degree of
diligence used in searching for the records of unidentified, presum-
ably homeless people.292 Certainly, in Forge's case, his fingerprints
and missing persons report were on file for all to see, yet neither
was found until after the organ harvesting. Even with the best of
289. Infra Part III.
290. Dworkin, supra note 256, at 278-79.
291. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, § 4, 8A U.L.A. 43 (1993).
292. Supra Introduction.
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intentions, the overriding goal of expedience 2 93 seems to cut
against a diligent, and thus time-consuming, search.
It is also important to remember that the United States currently
employs an opt-in organ procurement system, under which people
generally record, or otherwise make known, their decision to do-
nate organs. Thus, unlike the European presumed consent or opt-
out systems,294 a person is under no obligation to register an organ
donation objection. Moreover, the European models show that
true opt-out systems require widespread public education and mo-
tivation to ensure a general understanding of the consequences of
inaction;295 no such protections are in place in the United States.
Finally, the fact that most Americans claim to support organ dona-
tion is irrelevant when analyzing presumed consent, for, as John
Stuart Mill notes, laws based on public opinion are quite likely to
be wrong when applied to the individual.296 Therefore, there is not
necessarily a correlation between strong public support and per-
sonal choice.
B. Family Rights
As many of the arguments discussed above are also applicable to
the family, this Note only briefly analyzes the separate effect of
presumed consent laws on the family's rights. The Supreme Court
has protected the choice to marry and have children, as well as the
right to make judgments about child rearing, education, and living
arrangements.297 Similarly, organ donation is an important family
decision that involves the right of family autonomy. After all, it is
the family that suffers the personal loss when a relative dies.
Moreover, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act expressly recognizes
the family's role in the organ donation decision-making process.
Both versions of the Act contain priority schemes under which
next of kin can donate their relative's organs,298 placing responsi-
bility for the donation decision firmly within the family's hands.
Furthermore, the family's ultimate decision to make or withhold an
anatomical gift will affect the way in which a relative is
remembered by those whom he or she cherished the most, that is,
293. 8A U.L.A. 44-45, § 4 cmt.
294. Supra Part I.A.
295. Supra Part I.A.
296. Mill, supra note 249, at 265.
297. Supra Part II.A.2.
298. Supra Part I.B.l.a.,b.
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the family members themselves. Therefore, the decision has a
profound psychological and emotional effect on the family.
The priority scheme thus inherently recognizes that family mem-
bers are best able to respect and honor their loved one's unex-
pressed wishes regarding organ donation. However, when an
unidentified person's relatives cannot be found quickly enough, the
state is given power to make this decision. As presumed consent
laws implicitly require the acting official to have no knowledge of
the donor's actual values or beliefs,299 the state's decision is made
with no regard as to how the individual would have responded to
the situation. Therefore, presumed consent allows the state to
standardize an individual's anatomical gift decision by consistently
opting to donate the person's organs, regardless of individual dis-
sension. According to Jed Rubenfeld, such despotic actions by the
government violate the Court's anti-totalitarian protections, which
specifically guard against a dominating and normalizing state.3°°
In addition, although the donation decision impacts others, it still
primarily involves the family. In particular, the decision to make
an anatomical gift will obviously benefit waiting-list patients who
need new organs to survive. The recipient's family and friends also
will gain from having their loved one restored to health. However,
these external benefits do not detract from the family-oriented na-
ture of the donation decision. To analogize, the Court has pro-
tected a parent's autonomy in directing the upbringing of a child,3 °1
even though that child's character, personality, and intelligence will
eventually affect society in myriad ways. Thus, external effects do
not transform a family decision about the structure and course of
family life into a societal one.
In choosing to make an anatomical gift, family members assume
decision-making power for their incompetent loved one. Similarly,
the Court has protected parental choices made on behalf of young
children who, because of age and sophistication, cannot make their
own informed decisions about education and religion.3 °2 Both sce-
narios respect the family members' right to make these determina-
tions, based on their familiarity with and love for the affected
individual. As noted above, presumed consent organ donation in-
stead gives this responsibility to the state, which has no personal
299. Id.
300. Rubenfeld, supra note 270, at 784.
301. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
302. See id.
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attachment to or affection for the incompetent person. In sum, or-
gan donation is an autonomous family decision, much like other
family choices already protected by the Supreme Court. Presumed
consent laws, which usurp the family's authority, violate the Con-
stitution's protections of privacy, autonomy, and liberty.
The state cannot justify the paternalistic intervention of pre-
sumed consent laws by claiming to act as Gerald Dworkin's insur-
ance policy, protecting against decisions made under extreme
pressure.3 °3 Because organ donation typically requires a generally
healthy body and a dead brain, potential donors are often the vic-
tims of sudden and extreme trauma. Therefore, the family's deci-
sion to make an anatomical gift will inevitably be made within a
maelstrom of emotion, as a beloved family member unexpectedly
lies dying. The nature and circumstances of the decision, which
make the psychological pressure unavoidable, thus are not suffi-
cient reason to confer donation power upon the state. Otherwise,
the state could donate organs in every sudden death situation, sim-
ply because the family is upset.
Finally, although Gerald Dworkin believes that paternalistic laws
are permissible in some situations, he nevertheless feels that the
state bears a heavy justification burden and must first utilize any
available alternative means, regardless of cost or inconvenience. 30 4
Using Dworkin's own analysis, the paternalism of presumed con-
sent should be the last available option, and not just a mere expedi-
ent one.
CONCLUSION
Until the government either improves our current opt-in organ
procurement system or fully adopts an opt-out model, with its con-
comitant expenditure of resources, it is not justified in using pre-
sumed consent to harvest organs from unidentified persons. The
viable alternatives to presumed consent organ harvesting have not
yet been exhausted. As it remains, presumed consent organ dona-
tion laws intrude upon constitutionally protected individual and
family-based rights, allowing an increasingly dominant state to
commandeer personal decisions and invade private bodies. By pa-
ternalistically "snatching bodies" according to its whims, the gov-
ernment has usurped people's autonomy in a wholesale disregard
for their constitutional rights. Because organ donation decisions
303. Dworkin, supra note 256, at 278-79.
304. Id. at 280.
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belong to the individual and the family, and not the state, pre-
sumed consent laws are both unethical and unconstitutional.
AS
